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EXECUTIVE SUMARY 
 
The current socio-economical context, in which nuclear power plants operate, is 
characterised by fast pace of change. Market liberalisation and long-term safe 
operation of the plants are some of the challenges that need to be tackled by the 
countries with nuclear power programmes. 
 
Human reliability aspects and organisational issues (e.g. organisational culture, 
organisational design, operation feedback, safety culture) are some areas where 
research is needed in order to further enhance the safety of the operating nuclear 
installations.  
These research priorities are addressed, among others, by the activities carried out 
within the EC-JRC action “Safe Operation of Nuclear Installation” (SONIS), which 
replies to the need of coordinating at European level the national efforts in view of 
improving the safety of the European nuclear installations. 
 
Notably, human and organisational factors have always paid a major influence on the 
safety of high-risk process industries. In particular, in the case of the nuclear industry, 
they intervene in all phases of the lifecycle.  
In the last 15-20 years, the awareness that nuclear power plants are complex socio-
technical systems increased, together with the recognition that safety is not only a 
technical matter, because it depends heavily on the behaviour of the people working in 
the lifecycle of nuclear installations. 
 
Two major accidents have occurred in the history of nuclear industry: the accident of 
Three Miles Island (TMI), in 1979, and the Chernobyl accident, in 1986. The first event 
pointed out both the need to better understanding human factors and improving 
training and procedures; the second event highlighted the relevance of organisational 
issues and promoted worldwide the concept of safety culture. 
 
Today, in spite of the huge amount of work devoted to human factors, an agreed 
classification of human errors is still missing, and there is the opinion that plant 
operational procedures should reflect more the insights gained by the study of human 
factors, in order to contribute to the improvement of nuclear safety. Moreover, in spite 
of the developments of the concept of safety and organisational culture, registered in 
particular in the last 10-15 years, also the concept of safety culture is not enough 
understood. Although several components of safety culture have been identified and 
there is agreement on them, a predictive system of assessment and monitoring has 
been not achieved yet. 
 
These issues are the subject of the present report, which presents the results of the 
first year of research carried out on human and organisational issues in the framework 
of the SONIS action. The report refers to cases taken from the operating experience, 
and compares the different practices in the EU and non-EU countries running a nuclear 
programme.   
 
The conclusions of the study highlight the need to improve the understanding of the 
influence of human and organisational factors on the safety performance of operating 
nuclear installations. Moreover, efforts should be devoted to developing tools and 
methods for monitoring the safety performances in a predictive manner. 
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Another interesting topic to be further explored is the valorisation within the regulatory 
process of the results of the research on human and organisational factors. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The present EU society is characterized by a very fast pace of technological change, 
which is much faster than the pace of change encountered in management structures 
and even faster than the pace of the change in legislation and regulation. Three 
distinctive aspects of these changes can be identified: 1) The increased scale of 
industrial installations, which enhances the risks for large-scale accidents; 2) The rapid 
development of information and communication, which produces a high integration and 
coupling of the systems, with the result that an event, or decision, can rapidly 
propagate and widespread; 3) The aggressive and competitive environment, which 
may induce decision-makers to focus on short-term instead of long-term criteria, like 
those related to safety, welfare and environmental impact [1].  
 
The Chernobyl accident, for instance, is a clear tragic example of the impact of a 
large-scale accident. Within the nuclear industry, the other landmark accident is the 
one that occurred at Three Mile Island, in 1979.  
The conclusions of the first accident analysis report of TMI pointed out the human 
dimension of the accident and attributed its deep causes to the failure of the US safety 
organizational system [2]. In spite of these clear indications, the focus was mainly put 
on the concept of “human error”. As a consequence, the understanding of the causes 
of human errors, and controlling or reducing their occurrence and impact, became a 
key-priority objective of the research and industrial community. 
 
Some years later, in 1986, the world was stroke by the Chernobyl accident, and the 
concept of “safety culture” was brought to the attention of the international community. 
The cultural perspective adopted by the technologists and criticized by the 
anthropologists, who lamented a depletion of the original concept of “culture”, gave 
relevance to the organizational facet of events, incidents and accidents. The IAEA 
confirmed that safety culture is both related to the individual and to the framework, 
which is the organization [3].  
 
It is our opinion that there is no meaning in distinguishing between human and 
organizational factors, because people build up and develop organizations, and 
organizations influence the development of people, the way in which they act and 
interact. Consequently, if for practical reasons one prefers to talk of human factors, or 
of organizational factors, in both cases she or he should keep in mind that truth can be 
only achieved through an approach which is holistic.  
Nuclear installation, and in particular NPPs, are complex systems, whose 
boundaries can be larger of what one assumes. For this reason, we prefer to reason in 
terms of man-technology-organization system (MTO), where the term organization not 
only designates the specific business (e.g. NPP), but includes also its interactions with 
the external world and institutions, because these interactions shape the organization 
and determine its existence. 
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1.2 The framework of the present study 
Nuclear operating installations face new challenges: market liberalization, 
deregulation, changes in the institutional ownership, ageing of plants and workforce, 
increased use of external contractors. For coping with the pressures of the new socio-
economical context, and to keep their safety uncompromised, nuclear installations 
have to optimize. Optimization is seen also in view of the long-term operation (LTO) of 
the facilities and it concerns several selected areas: maintenance, testing, surveillance 
and inspection (MS&I) programs, engineering programs supporting operation, 
operating procedures and human reliability aspects (including - among others - human 
factors, safety culture, organisational culture, organisational design, operation 
feedback). 
 
The optimisation of these areas requires a large effort of development of new 
techniques and models, particularly in the field of component qualification, use of 
probabilistic assessment methods and risk-informed techniques, and improved 
awareness and insight of human factors, organisational design and culture.  
In particular, with respect to human and organizational factors, the analysis of the 
operation feedback confirmed the need to improve the understanding of the role and 
interplay of human and organisational factors within the nuclear industry, in order to 
support the safety performance of nuclear installations and improve the effectiveness 
of regulatory practices. Consequently, it is necessary that the concerned stakeholders 
(e.g. operating companies and regulators) share their operating experience. 
 
The purpose of the new project of the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission, i.e. the institutional action “Safe Operation of Nuclear Installations” 
(SONIS), is to facilitate the coordination of the effort among the European Countries for 
the sake of the improvement of the safety of European installations, developing 
harmonised approaches to safe plant operation. In fact, both the development and the 
implementation of optimised techniques require activities (e.g. for the collection of data, 
for the validation of modes) that cannot be managed only at the country level but need 
an integrated European approach.  
 
A specific task of SONIS is dedicated to human and organizational factors in 
nuclear installations, with the aim of facing the related issues in an integrated research 
approach, providing ready-to-use, validated methods, models and recommendations 
for procedures.  
This report covers the results of the first year of research in the framework of 
SONIS.   
1.3 Objectives of the report 
The purpose of this report is to overview selected issues, human and organisational, 
present in nuclear installations, in particular nuclear power plants, identifying areas 
where further research is needed. Due to the great deal and complexity of 
organisational factors affecting the safety of a nuclear installation, the issues described 
in the report do not constitute an exhaustive list.  
The focus is on both factors intervening during the operation of a nuclear installation 
and factors emerging during maintenance activities.  
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Managers of nuclear installations, responsible of maintenance activities, and 
contractors represent some of the professional categories to which this report is 
addressed. 
1.4 Structure of the report 
Chapter 1 describes the socio-technical context to the outcomes of the analysis. 
Chapter 2 describes the intervention of human factors in safety, providing a 
classification of them. Chapter 3 is devoted to organisational factors and their impact 
on safety. Chapter 4 is focused on procedures and their implementation. Chapter 5 is 
devoted to human and organisational factors in maintenance. Chapter 6 is on safety 
culture and on the regulatory approaches for improving it. Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusions of the report. Chapter 8 highlights areas where future work is needed. 
2 Human factors and safety 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of the nuclear power generation, human performance has been 
a very important factor in all phases of the plant lifecycle: design, commissioning, 
operation, maintenance, surveillance, modification, decommissioning and dismantling. 
This aspect has been confirmed by recent operating experience.  
In fact, 48% of the events reported in the IAEA/NEA Incident Reporting System 
(IRS) are affected by human errors. Moreover, about 63% of the events reported in IRS 
and having significant human contribution, happened during operation, and 37% during 
shut-down [4].  
 
In the past 15-20 years human behaviour and performance in organizations 
received an increasing attention.   
The reason is to be found in recent events (not only in the nuclear industry), e.g. 
Space Shuttle Columbia Accident (2003), Davis-Besse NPP incident (2002), the 
collision of two trains at Paddingtion, London (1999), Chernobyl accident (1986).  
 
In the case of the nuclear power industry, the analysis of the events reported in IRS 
shows that in the last 20 years there has been a slight increase in the contribution of 
human errors to events, from about 45% in the 1980s to approximately 55% in recent 
years [4]. These data highlighted the need to improve both the management capability 
at nuclear installations and the efficiency of the regulatory oversight process.  
The increased perception of the importance of human performance is also an effect 
of the significant improvement of nuclear technology across the years, which reduced 
the relative contribution of technical causes to safety-related events. As a 
consequence, more focus was devoted to human and organizational factors in the 
recent IRS reports.  
 
There are also other reasons behind the high contribution of human and 
organisational factors to events: the new challenges that the nuclear industry is facing, 
the deregulation, the increased use of contractors, the ageing and turnover of the 
workforce, new technologies. 
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The current view is that not only the performance of the individual matters, but 
mostly the organization and the environment where the individual is operating. This 
perspective implies the recognition that individuals within a nuclear installation are part 
of a socio-technical system, and their behaviour and performance are influenced by the 
organization and its culture. 
2.2 Concept of human error and classification of human errors 
Every form of communication requires some references and agreement about some 
basic concepts and terms. Although it might seem scholastic, it is appropriate to start 
from providing the definition (one of the available ones) of human error. 
 
Error means a thing done wrongly and a state of being wrong in beliefs or 
behaviour. James Reason suggests that the occurrence of a human error requires both 
the presence of a “end-state”, or objective, and of “means” to achieve it [5]. The 
consequence of an error is the deviation from end-states. 
 
A second needed step is to introduce a classification of human errors, one of the 
many classifications available. In fact, in spite of the fast development of the discipline 
in the last decades, there is still no universally agreed taxonomy for human errors. 
Nearly every scholar who has published in the field has proposed some kind of 
classification.  
Some literature reports that human errors are usually distinguished in “errors of 
omission” and “errors of commission”. Unfortunately, this simplistic presentation might 
be misinterpreted and one might think that this is a comprehensive classification. In 
reality, it is possible to divide the available classifications in three groups, 
corresponding to the following levels: 
 
¾ Behavioural  
   
¾ Contextual 
 
¾ Conceptual 
 
The behavioural level is that of “what appears”. It is the surface, what can be seen. 
At this level corresponds the distinction between “error of omission” and “of 
commission”. 
Just below the behavioural stratum lays the contextual level, which considers the 
environment where man is acting and interacting. For instance, the air traffic controller 
is exposed to a stimuli-intensive environment, characterized by a relevant background 
noise.  
The level where the underlying causes of human errors can be found is the one 
embracing the cognitive sphere: the conceptual level. 
 
The classification of human errors that we refer to is based on Searle’s distinction 
between “prior intention” and “intention in action” [6]. An example will help in describing 
the concepts.  
 
“I want to go to work by car” is a prior intention, which will become, when 
implemented, an intention in action. But, the action I want to implement is made of a 
great deal of separated, sequential or simultaneous actions (e.g. to insert the key in the 
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door of the car; to open the door; to seat into the car; to close the door; etc.) each 
being a specific intention in action, without being anticipated by a prior intention. In fact, 
my prior intention is expressed by the tag “I want to go to work by car”, which is at 
higher level and usually combined with a mental picture. It is not my prior intention “to 
open the door of my car” or “to close the door”; neither “to insert the key” in the start-
block.  
Similar examples can be taken e.g. from the operation of a nuclear power plant, in 
particular from the actions that take place in a control room.  
 
The distinction between ‘prior intentions’ and ‘intentions in action’ is synthetically 
expressed by Searle’s statement “All intentional actions have intentions in actions but 
not all intentional actions have prior intentions”.  
Figure 1 [5] provides a useful algorithm for classifying human errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The action which is not supported by prior intentions and that does not correspond 
to any intension in actions, is an involuntary or nonintentional action. For this type of 
actions it is not possible to talk of “human error”, because there is no deviation from 
any desired objective or end-state, neither from any path of implementation of actiona.  
Spontaneous or subsidiary actions are those that do not follow a prior intention, but 
that correspond to specific intentions in actions. This is the case, for example, of the 
numerous actions that I am carrying out, in a spontaneous way, when driving my car 
for going at work, which is the end-state I am aiming at.  
 
Slips and lapses are unintentional actions: they represent failures in the 
implementation of a prior intention. The difference is that slips are observable whilst 
lapses happen at cognitive level (e.g. a forgotten item). For this reason, slips and 
lapses are failures of execution or storage. 
A mistake is an error that appears when there is a prior intention and an intention in 
action, and the implementation of the action is correct. In spite of the correct 
                                                 
a The concepts expressed are consolidated even in law. (e.g. the distinction and different weight that nonintentional 
actions and intentional action have in criminal law). 
Execution 
Failure 
Planning 
Failure 
Human 
Error 
Figure 1  Classification of human errors 
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implementation, the intended action does not bring to the desired end-state. This 
means that the cause of the failure must be searched in the planning of the action.  
To the presented algorithm one could add also the “violations”, which are intended 
actions that one carries out being aware of the infringement of the rules in force (e.g. 
intended non-observance of procedures; acts of sabotage).  
Figure 2 [5] gives a more detailed description of the presented taxonomy.  
 
For the sake of completeness, it is important to recall also the distinction between 
‘error of omission’ and ‘error of commission’. Briefly, the first type takes place when an 
item, a relevant detail, is forgotten in the implementation of an action (or procedure). 
The error of omission is a failure to perform an action completely. For what expressed, 
slips and lapses mainly lead to errors of omissions. Differently, an error of commission 
is an incorrect performance of an action. Human reliability analysis (HRA) studies 
mainly focus on errors of omission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Classification of human errors including violations 
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2.3 Intervention of human factors in other industries: the experience 
of air traffic controllers 
As showed by Figure 3, the contribution of human factors on failures is perceived 
also in other industries. In particular, it is remarkably relevant in the Air Traffic Control 
(ATC).  
75
90
80
85
70
85
Jet
T ransport
A ir T raffic M aritim e C hem ical N uclear
Pow er
R oad
T ransport
 
Figure 3 Contribution of human factors to events registered in high-risk industries. The values are in %  
(Courtesy of Paul Richardson and Luci Staples (AMEC NNC)). 
 
 
The task of the controllers is characterized by high intensity of the demands on both 
visual and auditory perceptions. Air Traffic Controllers (ATCs) have to process a major 
amount of information in a limited time-window, and have to maintain their performance 
for periods of up to 2h at a time over a shift. Several types of attention may be 
involved: focused attention (e.g. monitoring of a specific emergency situation); 
selective attention (i.e. carry our related tasks simultaneously; e.g. listening to a pilot 
report and checking the data track block); divided attention (i.e. to carry out different 
tasks simultaneously; e.g. listening to the radio-telephone and writing on the strips); 
sustained attention (e.g. radar monitoring during night shifts). And the controllers have 
to shift their attention from one source of data to another.  
 
In a review of ATC incidents and accidents occurred between 1985 and 1997 it was 
found that attentions and memory failures were the most common types of errors by 
ATC personnel [7]. A study carried out in 1996 was focused on 143 aviation incidents 
involving flight crew and air traffic controller errors related to situation awareness. Of 
the 262 errors identified, 72% of the ATCs errors and 77% of the flight crew errors 
were errors of perception [8].  
Following these findings, a study was carried out on the errors of perception [9]. The 
study recalls the two main theoretical views of perception: 1) the indirect or 
constructivist theories, which consider perception as an active process that is 
dependent on internal processes as expectations, hypotheses, long-term memory, 
motivation and emotion; 2) the direct or ecological theories, which consider that the 
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visual stimuli are sufficient to the interaction of people with the environment, without the 
involvement of internal processes.  
The two approaches imply that perception is the outcome of processes of different 
nature: top-down processes, in the case of indirect theories; bottom-up processes in 
the case of direct theories. The study provides insight into the types of perceptual 
errors that occur in ATC.  
The errors identified have been distributed in two categories: a) Errors of detection 
(mainly errors of visual detection); b) Errors of identification and comparison (mainly 
hear-back errors).  
Associated error mechanisms have been also identified: expectations bias; 
distraction and preoccupation; spatial and perceptual confusion, perceptual tunneling 
(that happens when the controller becomes too focused, and looses visual information 
on other sides of the display); stimulus overload and vigilance failure.  
This taxonomy is at a different level from that between errors of omission and errors 
of commission (see §2.2): as said, the latter concerns the behavioural level, whilst the 
former, mentioned in the present section, concerns the conceptual level. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this report, we agree with the approach of considering 
human factors within the organisational framework and in relation with the other 
organisational elements. Next chapter is dedicated to the organisational issues 
relevant for nuclear safety.  
3 Organisational factors and safety 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been said that immediately after the TMI accident the focus of the industrial 
and scientific community has been put on “human error”. Research programmes have 
been run worldwide which have improved the structure and content of training, as well 
as the man-machine interface and procedures. It has been also said that after the 
Chernobyl accident a new perspective was gradually adopted, which changed the way 
we perceive events.  
 
The view developed by the scientific community since the mid 1980s is that events, 
accidents, incidents and crisis, are not just the consequence of technical failures and 
human errors, but they are delivered in a favourable organizationalb context as a result 
of historical evolution.  
In this perspective, human errors are some of the direct and immediate causes 
which generate an event, which is favoured by local causes (e.g. technical and 
ergonomic conditions, environmental characteristics) and by global organizational 
conditions (e.g. production pressures, lack of communication among stakeholders, 
weak safety culture) [2].  
Plant staff and the management system represent an important line of defence in 
nuclear installations. Although management and organizational factors have a major 
impact on safety, it is only recently that they received the attention that deserve. 
 
 When analyzing an event from the organizational point of view, it is important to 
define the organization and its boundaries. In the case of high-risk industries, 
                                                 
b Context favourable to the development of an accident. 
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considering the strong link between all the involved actors (e.g. plant, safety control 
organization, sub-contractors) the term organization is often used to encompass, 
together with the in-house business, directly affected by the event, also other related 
businesses or institutions, and even the entire industrial sector concerned.  
An organization is shaped by its interactions with the external world. In particular, 
the organizational approach applied to nuclear power plants should take into 
consideration the system NPP-Regulator, because the relationship between the NPP 
and the regulatory authority is the most important for the excellent performance of the 
NPP.   
3.2 Organisational factors common to high-risk industries 
The difficulty of analyzing and interpreting organizational factors is due to the fact 
that such factors are not in a chronological order, which means that they are not 
related in a linear cause-effect way. For this reason, the latest decision and human 
error directly involved in an accident should be considered in relation to the critical 
decisions made before the accident, and even the decisions which took place during 
the design phase of the technical installation or establishment of the organization. In 
this way, it is possible to outline what is called the “organizational network” of the 
accident, which developed as a function of space and time beyond the boundaries of 
the organisation.  
 
Organisational accidents have a “incubation time” which is the time during which the 
organizational context becomes favourable to the release of the accident, and the 
available barriers degrade. During this time there are warning signals. The weak 
signals are symptoms which already give indication of the forthcoming catastrophic 
event; unfortunately, weak signals are difficult to be detected, interpreted and acted 
upon. In most of the cases, weak signals are recognized too late: when the accident is 
already happened.  
The strongest warning signals are the precursor events, which are incidents or 
accidents without catastrophic consequences, because controlled in time, or because 
of the presence of barriers that did not allow the event to develop further.  
 
The analysis, under organizational perspective, of incidents and accidents which 
occurred in several process industries, and in transportation, revealed the recurrent 
presence of a certain number of factors which plaid a decisive role in the delivery of the 
incident or accident. The major recurrent factors are [2]: 
 
• Weakness of the organizational safety culture; 
• Complexity and inappropriateness of the organization 
• Limits of operational feedback 
• Production pressures 
• Failure of the control mechanisms. 
 
It has been said that the relationship NPP-Regulator plays a major role in the 
achievement of excellent performances by a NPP. There is general agreement that 
excellent performers are those NPPs which had been able to combine operation 
performances and safety at the highest level.  
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There are several examples worldwide showing that if this balance is not 
maintained, then the suitability of the utility in managing high-risk technology will be 
challenged by the public and by the regulator. Safety is a condition that, if not fulfilled, 
will jeopardize the existence of a business and – even – of an entire industry. 
 
In the following section we are going to quote some examples [10] which are 
indicative both of the relevance of the good functioning of the system NPP-Regulator, 
and of the strong need of good Leadership for guaranteeing safety.  
3.3 Examples of organisational factors consequences on the NPP-
Regulator system 
Ontario Hydro 
In Canada, Ontario Hydro (OH) shut down seven of their nineteen units in 1997 
because of long standing problems inherent to management, process and equipment. 
An assessment initiated by new senior nuclear management found areas for 
performance improvement in all operating stations. It was concluded that urgent 
actions were needed for changing the culture, structure and management of Ontario 
Hydro Nuclear (OHN).  
Some of the OH safety management shortcomings resulted in the non-observance 
of the procedures and in the tendency to put production ahead of safety, which clearly 
indicated degradation in safety culture. This situation created problems as the plants 
got older and as the original experienced staff were replaced.  
 
Corporate management and the regulator were also part of the cultural context, 
because they tolerated the situation. Although internal and external reports and peer 
reviews, including corporate evaluations, had revealed significant operational problems 
for many years, the senior  management answer was ineffective.  
Various programmes were implemented, without success, with the purpose of 
improving the situation. Furthermore, no analysis of the reasons of these failures has 
been carried out before of starting new programmes.   
The lack of effective corporate oversight of the management aspects of the nuclear 
programme, an insular and complacent attitude, the failure to maintain a constant long-
term vision, as well as the failure to establish critical oversight and self-assessment 
with a questioning attitude at all levels of the organization, were regarded as primary 
causes of the consequent decline in performance. 
 
For many years the regulator, the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), had 
expressed its criticism towards the utility’s performance, and had required 
improvements in a number of areas, as condition for the utility to maintain the license 
of the stations. They had addressed several observations to the President and Board 
of Directors of Ontario Hydro, with little effect.  
 
Millstone 
Another case in US is represented by the Millstone plant, whose units were in 1996 
all shut down by the utility holding the license, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company. 
The USNRC ordered the implementation of independent third-party oversight to verify 
the adequacy of the licensee efforts to establish adequate design bases and design 
controls, in such a way to have additional assurance that the licensee had identified 
and corrected existing problems in the design and configuration control processes.  
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NRC was also concerned about the ineffective way the licensee management 
handled safety issues raised by its employees. For this reasons, NRC emitted in 1996 
a second order to the licensee to develop a comprehensive plan for handling safety-
related issues raised by the employees, and to have an independent third-party 
overseeing the implementation of the plan.  
Millstone problems included ineffective leadership, lack of good safety culture, and 
inadequate resources provided by the corporate management.  
 
The primary cause of problems at Millstone appeared to be a breakdown and failure 
of management leadership from the CEO to senior site executives, who were not 
aware of the serious state of key performance issues.  
An effective corrective action programme and crucial self-evaluation processes 
were not fully appreciated by senior management even after they were identified by 
outside and regulatory agencies. In top of all this was the very poor management 
communication from the top to the bottom of the organization and a consequent lack of 
trust between management, employees and the regulator. 
 
Other US cases 
There had been in US also other cases of shut-down due to safety management 
problems. In 1987 the NRC ordered the shut-down of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power 
Station operated by Philadelphia Electric Company. The reasons were: case of 
operator sleeping, inattention to duties, failure to adhere to procedures, and 
management inaction or inadequate action. 
 
European cases: Sweden  
During the period 1990-93, SKI noted the recurrence of MTO-related events at 
Barsebäck Kraft AB. The plant was undergoing a review of management and 
organization, and a reorganization was envisaged, which was expected to tackle the 
problems.  
In reality, a major reorganization was implemented, without previously assessing its 
impact on human performance. Consequently, the reorganization instead of solving the 
matters increased the MTO-related events.  
The regulator, aware of the situation, put the plant under special supervision, which 
implied the introduction of a major improvement effort carefully monitored by the 
regulator. The plant was considered suitable for ‘normal supervision’ in 1997.  
 
The reported examples, taken from different national and cultural context, are 
indicative of some major organisational (and human) issues that can affect the safety 
of a NPP. They represent cases of plants that had been upon a time good performers.  
For instance, OH showed excellent performance during the construction and 
commissioning of the units. Most of the staff went through the commissioning period 
and was very experienced: they were very familiar with the plant.  
The good performance and awareness of expertise level, and some of the cultural 
characteristics which produced operational excellence in the early years became 
factors contributing to the primary causes resulting in the shutdown.  
These factors contributed to the development of a unhealthy cultural context in 
which not only the plant management, but also the corporate management and the 
regulator ended up to be trapped.  
 
Lessons learnt 
A lesson to be learned is that often problems, even though proved by objective 
evidence, are not taken seriously enough or early enough to impede their further 
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growth; until the point where significant regulator actions become necessary. In 
particular, there is a common scenario that is typical of plants that “had very good initial 
performance that started to slip”.  
This scenario involves three distinct phases, namely: a period of denial, or even 
arrogance in which the utility believes there is no problem, and the regulator has it 
wrong; then comes the recognition that there is a problem and the conclusion that the 
problem has to be dealt with seriously and urgently; finally, the difficult recovery 
process from a too degraded situation [10].  
 
The denial may take many different forms. In the OHN case, it appears to reflect a 
lack of acumen on a senior corporate management level (e.g. inappropriate follow-up 
of two independent corporate peer reviews  conducted in the early 90s). In the case of 
Millstone, the regulator had identified in a report that an unhealthy work environment 
existed, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not welcome or promote a 
questioning attitude.  
 
The reported cases show that although regulatory strategies may vary between 
countries they face some common issues. A major one is to identify criteria for when 
regulatory action should be initiated against the progressive degradation in the 
performance of safety management. Moreover, both regulators and utilities initially had 
a strong focus on technical issues and have been handling safety issues related to 
management and human performance in a reactive way, i .e. in response to failures 
identified through various types of events.  
 
In the Canadian and US experiences it appeared that the regulator during the initial 
phases of identification of weaknesses in safety management processes has been not 
able to effectively influence top management to make necessary improvements. 
Repeated changes in management approach and introduction of new, often 
unsuccessful programmes, without due analysis, was accepted by the regulator rather 
than treated as a major indicator of problems with the safety management processes.  
 
In general, and with the exception of cases like Sweden, regulator did not put much 
effort on management and organizational capability to handle the interaction between 
technology, economics, human factors and safety in a changing environment.  
Furthermore, regulators in general have not paid in the past as much attention to 
the impact of organizational changes on safety as they have on technical plant 
modifications. More strict regulatory requirements on potential safety consequences of 
organizational changes as well as careful regulatory review of these changes may 
have prevented some of the problems experienced by the utilities.  
 
It has been said before that the violation of procedures was one of the most 
worrying symptoms of safety degradation registered, for example, at Ontario Hydro. 
Unfortunately, records of events indicate that the non-observance of procedures is a 
recurring failure.  
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4 Operating Procedures and human and organisational 
factors 
4.1 Introduction  
After the TMI accident the focus of the human reliability research has been put on 
human performance and, consequently on man-machine interface issues, training and 
improvement of procedures. Procedures are a form of aid that guides operators in 
performing tasks. They can be considered an important part of the human-machine 
interaction system, and they greatly influence the operator performance and reliability. 
Moreover, they are part of the management system and aim at supporting human 
performance. For what said, procedures have both human and organizational facets.  
Consequently, the objective of the procedures design is to achieve procedures which 
are:  
a) Technically correct,  
b) Clearly understandable (without introducing task overload),  
c) Easily executable in a correct way.  
 
Although well-trained and expert operators can deal with normal tasks without the 
help of manuals, in situations as normal plant start-up and shut-down most operators 
reported physic and cognitive overload.  
4.2 The application of procedures and nuclear safety 
The existence and implementation of operating procedures in hazardous industries, 
as the nuclear power industry, should support a high level of safety for the plants. But, 
the existence of procedures itself is not a guarantee of safety, as showed by e.g. the 
accident of Three Miles Island. A major point of discussion is how procedures should 
be used by operators.  
 
From the point of view of the procedure’s designer and of the executive manager 
and training supervisor, the operator must apply to the letter and step-by-step the 
instructions written in the procedures. This viewpoint assumes that all the relevant 
equipment is available; that the passage from a process state to another is achieved 
via a chronological sequence of operator’s actions; that the operator that will use the 
procedure be an “average” operator with a given competence. What is missing, in 
general, are competence requirements for the operators that will use the procedure, 
because the underlying assumption is that everything that must be done is written in 
the procedure.  
 
This view contains a first big limitation, which is the fact that a procedure is the 
mirror of the theoretical and practical knowledge of the operation of a process, valid in 
a certain moment. There is, usually, a gap between the procedure and the reality, 
which will be showed by the future operational experience and future research. As a 
consequence of it, procedures are often updated or substantially changed.  
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But how the operators use procedures? 
 
This has been showed by a study, carried out by EDF on more than 100 realistic 
tests on full-scale simulators, during which the operators had to cope with accident 
scenarios [11]. The study revealed that: 
a) Divergences from the strict observance of procedures are rare in accident 
situations, but, due to their frequency, they cannot be ignored; 
b) These deviations are the result of a gap between the procedure and reality, 
because not all events that operators face are foreseen by procedures. 
This latter aspect is due to the fact that, whilst operation is dynamic, procedures 
have a static nature, which do not consider factors as e.g. the interactions between the 
process parameters and between the members of the operation team.  
The major conclusion of the study is that the most appropriate application of 
procedures is to have strict observance of them, when they adhere to the real situation, 
and to rely on the operator’s expert judgment when procedures divert from reality. For 
this purpose, and for supporting a more pro-active role of the operator, the operator’s 
training must allow the operator to understand the phenomena occurring under 
emergency operating conditions [11]. 
 
In recent times the use of computerised procedures has become more and more 
widespread. 
The next paragraph deals with this type of procedures. 
4.3 Computerised procedures 
It has been said that procedures are aids for operators, in particular in 
circumstances characterized by unexpected behaviour of the system. In particular, the 
support of aids is necessary in emergency situations. In these circumstances, the 
operators refer to paper-based or computer-based emergency operating procedures 
(EOPs). The former type is the traditional one; the latter was introduced with the 
development of information technology. For this reasons, computerized procedure 
systems (CPSs) have been introduced in new NPPs or modified NPPs since the 
1980s.  
An important aspect is that the content of procedures has been continuously 
changed and adapted to the development of control technology and automation in NPP 
control rooms; differently, the structure of the procedures remained substantially the 
same [12].   
 
Computerized EOPs provide enhanced support to operators, in particular due to the 
advantage of the interactive features. However, the difference between hard-copy and 
computerized EOPs is not only in the medium, but also in the presentation style of the 
information. Little research has been carried out on the comparison of the graphical 
computerized procedures mainly used (i.e. flowchart procedures, success trees and 
their combination).  
 
The study carried out by Xu et al [13] suggests that the presentation style can 
influence significantly the error rate when operators – even well-trained ones - are 
carrying out EOPs; this aspect is often ignored and should be taken into consideration 
by designers. They also confirmed that task complexity significantly influences the 
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operation time and the error rate in EOPs operation. Their study also confuted the 
opinion that the execution of computerized EOPs is simpler and easier than of paper-
based ones; furthermore, it showed the need of adequate training for performing 
computerized EOPs. The main limitations of their study was that the emergency 
operation system was neither a NPP control room nor a simulator, but a simulated 
computer software system in a laboratory; moreover, the subjects of the study were 
university undergraduate students (with background in engineering) and not operators. 
4.4 Evaluation of the complexity of emergency operating procedures 
It has been reported that symptom-based EOPs have been widely used to enhance 
the safety of NPPs by means of a reduction of the operators’ workload in the relevant 
conditions.  
The drawback of the symptom-based EOPs is that the operators are obliged to 
perform required tasks (made of several steps) for restoring process disturbances and, 
meanwhile, carry out other tasks for maintaining plant safety functions. As a 
consequence, these procedures may add additional burden on operators who have 
both to monitor symptoms and oversight the whole process in which EOP steps have 
to be carried out.   
 
To tackle the problems, specific requirements for developing EOPs have been 
prepared, and their aim is to have EOPs that allow operators to easily understand the 
context of the emergency intervention, and implying tasks that can be carried out within 
an “acceptable” workload and “task performance time”, the latest being the time 
elapsed between a task entry and exit.  
Whilst time requirements for the performance of the procedural steps can be 
extracted from several plant design and maintenance documents, it is difficult to define 
the acceptable workload or acceptable workload range, because it is affected by 
several organizational factors difficult to be quantified, because they are plant specific. 
Anyway, as reported by Park et al [14] some researchers suggest that the acceptable 
workload would range from 50% to 75%.  
 
To ensure that the EOPs satisfy the mentioned requirements, checklists are used. 
The advantage of checklists is the easiness of the use; they also present 
disadvantages. For example, the results of the use of checklists are subjective, 
because they are dependent on the experience and on the knowledge level of the 
inspection personnel. Moreover, the fact that the EOPs satisfy the items of checklists 
does not guarantee that the EOPs fulfil the mentioned requirements.  
For example, in the case of steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event, the 
operators should carry out the relevant EOP, fulfilling all the steps of the required tasks 
within a certain time [14]. Even the case that the EOPs satisfy all items of the checklist 
does not guarantee that operators can finish the steps within the required performance 
time, or that the workload of the operators is acceptable. This is due to the fact that the 
checklists approach is suitable for a qualitative and not for a quantitative estimation. As 
a consequence of this qualitative aspect, the development of EOPs implies that their 
validity be certified through a mock-up test or a walk-through.  
 
Because the evaluation based on mock-up tests and walk-through is difficult to be 
carried out, because it implies demanding and time-consuming activities, Park et al [14] 
have developed a method for quantifying the degree of step complexity (SC), which is 
a measure of the complexity of the step of a EOP; this measurement is based on 
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entropy measures which have been used to evaluate the degree of complexity of 
software in software engineering.  
 
The measure of SC is based on the sub-measures of the major factors that 
complicate the performance of EOP steps. In particular, on the basis of research 
results and of the operating experience of different industries, as nuclear power 
production, chemical plants and aviation industries, the following major factors have 
been identified: 
1. The amount of information of each EOP step; 
2. The logic structure of each EOP step; 
3. The number of actions included in each EOP step. 
For measuring the SC, the entropy measure has been used. This concept has been 
adopted in several research areas because it is able to provide a degree of complexity. 
On the basis of the concept and considering the three identified major complexity 
factors, the following respective complexity sub-measures have been carried out: 
1. Step Information Complexity (SIC); 
2. Step Logic Complexity (SLC); 
3. Step Size Complexity (SSC). 
And the SC of an EOP step has been calculated as function of them.  
The appropriateness of the SC measures, as defined, has been validated versus 
subjective and objective assessment techniques, respectively the NASA Task Load 
Index (NASA-TLX) [15] and step performance time data.  
 
As mentioned elsewhere in the text, human and organisational factors play a major 
role in every phase of the entire plant lifecycle. The following chapter reports the 
results of a research carried out on HOF in maintenance of NPPs. 
5 Human and organisational factors in maintenance of 
NPPs 
5.1 Introduction 
The FP7c EC-JRC action Safe Operation of Nuclear Installations (SONIS) 
encompasses, as task, the project Safety of Eastern Nuclear Facilities (SENUF), which 
was launched in FP6d. This project is mainly focused on maintenance and 
maintenance optimization, replying to the need of the Industry to guarantee the safety 
of the nuclear power plants whilst achieving the optimization of costs, which is 
compulsory due to the competitive pressures of the open electricity market.  
                                                 
c FP7 is the 7th Euratom Framework Programme for Research, Development and Demonstration. It covers the 
period 2007-2011. 
d FP6 is the 6th Euratom Framework Programme for Research, Development and Demonstration, which ended in 
2006. 
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Although the focus of human reliability research has been given to the performance 
of control room crew in post-initiating event conditions, it has been recognized that also 
maintenance has a significant impact on the severity of an incident (e.g. by erroneously 
disabling safety-related equipment). In particular, common cause and other dependent 
human failures of safety systems may relevantly contribute to the reactor core damage 
risks.  
5.2 Analysis of human originated common cause failures in 
maintenance activities 
The role of human failures in maintenance activities has been the subject of a 
research carried out at the nuclear power plants of Olkiluoto (Units 1 & 2) and Loviisa 
(Units 1 & 2). In the former NPP, 4400 fault repair work orders have been considered 
along a period of three years (from 1992 to 1994); among them, 334 human error 
cases have been identified: 206 single errors and 14 common cause failure events; in 
the latter, the three-year maintenance history, form 1995 to 1997, has been 
considered.  
 
The 14091 fault repair work orders concerning this period have been analysed and 
183 human error cases have been identified: 149 single errors and 34 common cause 
failures [16,17]. In the following paragraph, the definition of common cause failure and 
common cause non-critical failure are reported. 
 
Definition of common cause failure (CCF) and common cause non-critical failure 
(CCNF) 
 
Common cause failures are similar failure cause or mechanism that may result or 
have resulted in multiple functionally critical failures in redundant subsystems. 
Common cause non-critical failures are similar failure mechanisms, which produce the 
deviation of the performance of redundant or parallel equipment from standards. 
CCNFs can be considered as early warning of causes that can develop into CCFs. 
 
Main Results of the Finnish study 
 
The analysis of the selected human error cases occurred at Olkiluoto and Loviisa 
showed that in both cases the higher number of single human errors concerned the 
instrumentation and control, and the electrical equipment (see Figure 4). The errors 
were mainly errors of commission, due to lack of attention. 
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Figure 4: Type of equipment affected by single human failures registered at Olkiluoto and Loviisa 
 
 
 
Analogously (see Figure 5), also the common cause failures and non-critical failures 
interested mainly the I&C and electrical equipment. Modifications and preventive 
maintenance were the tasks that mainly brought to HCCFs and HCCNFs. It has been 
found that the human common failures and non-critical failures have been mainly 
caused by planning deficiencies and insufficient knowledge (see Figure 6). Moreover, a 
distinctive aspect was that only a minor percentage of the human multiple errors were 
detected during the outage and operability verification phase (installation checks, 
functional testing, start-up testing), whilst more than half of them became evident 
during the start-up and power states. This shortcoming emphasized the presence of 
weaknesses in the operative and organizational barriers. 
 
The research pointed out the need of improving the operability verification after 
maintenance, both in terms of planning and of testing programme. In particular, it was 
suggested to have the planning of the operability verification better integrated into the 
maintenance process and to have the operability verification tailored on the type and 
extent of interventions carried out, and not as a standard procedure.  
The need of establishing, maintaining and improving organizational barriers (e.g. 
review of the start-up testing, of the appropriate review of the work and test planning of 
the work-orders) was also pointed out. 
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Distribution of the HCCN and HCCF cases among the equipment types
Loviisa 1 & 2 (1995-97). 
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Loviisa 1 & 2. Underlying causes of multiple 
human errors (HCCF and HCCN events).
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Figure 5: Type of equipment affected by multiple common cause human failures registered at Olkiluoto and 
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6 Safety Culture 
6.1 Introduction  
Safety culture is one of the factors that affect the degree of safety and consequently 
the performance and existence of an organization. The idea of safety culture existed 
already in 1980, but it was widely spread after the International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group (INSAG) Summary Report on the Post-Accident Meeting on the 
Chernobyl Accident in 1986. In spite of the diffusion and widespread use of the term - 
not only in publications about hazardous technologies - safety culture is not fully 
understood and no agreement on its definition has been reached. As a consequence, 
there is no agreed and validated method for measuring safety culture. 
6.2 Culture, organizational culture and safety culture 
The culture concept has been traditionally used by anthropologists. As reported by 
Choudhry et al [18], a reference definition of culture is given by The American Heritage 
Dictionary, which defines culture as “the totality of socially transmitted behaviour 
patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought 
considered as the expression of a particular period, class, community, or population”. 
 
As suggested by Sorensen [19], “INSAG has borrowed the term ‘culture’ from either 
anthropologists or the organizational development community (who in turn borrowed it 
from anthropologists)”; anyway, “INSAG publications make no reference to the bodies 
of literature in those fields”. The same Chroudhry et al [18] agree with Brigges on the 
fact that ‘culture’ as used by anthropologists is different from ‘culture’ used by the 
organizational development scholars.  
 
According to Reason [20], the definition that best captures most of the essentials of 
organizational culture is the one given by Uttal in 1983: “Shared values (what is 
important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with an organization’s structures 
and control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do things around 
here).”  
 
Another reference definition of organizational culture is given by Schein [21]: “A 
pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as 
it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration; that 
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems”.  
Schein proposed also a three-level model of culture, widely adopted, which 
considers culture made of: 
 
1. Artifacts 
 
2. Values en Beliefs 
 
3. Basic Assumptions. 
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The term ‘artifacts’ denotes the observable daily features of the organization: e.g. 
office layouts, jargon, activities, rituals.  
‘Values and Beliefs’ include the espoused values of an organization, e.g. the 
judgments about what is good and what is bad, and statements as “safety is our top 
priority”. 
‘Basic assumptions’ represent the model of reality that the organization has and 
transmit to its members. This includes, e.g., how the organization regards people, how 
the organization sees the external world. It is a tacit dimension, which actually drives 
the organizational behaviour.  
It is important to note that artifacts are, as said, easy to be seen, but difficult to be 
interpreted. It is possible to understand them only if we have some insights on the 
basic assumptions of the organization.  
 
The Schein’s model has been applied to safety cultural [22,23]. As mentioned 
before, the concept of safety culture has been introduced by the International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) in the Summary Report on the Post-Accident Meeting 
on the Chernobyl Accident in 1986 [24]. The concept was further developed [25], and 
defined later as follows [3]:  
“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and 
individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance”. 
As pointed our by Reason, the INSAG definition is more a statement which specifies 
“an ideal but not the means to achieve it”, and he considers more useful the definition 
given by the UK’s Health and Safety Commission in 1993 [27]:  
 
“The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, 
and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programmes. 
Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communications 
founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by 
confidence in the efficacy of preventive measure”. 
6.3 Components of safety culture 
INSAG-4 [26] reports about “universal features of safety culture” and distinguishes 
between two general components of safety culture: the first being “the necessary 
framework within an organization”; the second being “the attitude of staff at all levels in 
responding to and benefiting from the framework”. 
 
Reason identifies four main components of safety culture [28]: 
 
1. Reporting culture, i.e. an organizational climate in which people are willing 
to report about their errors and near-misses; 
2. Just culture, i.e. an atmosphere of trust which encourages people in 
providing essential information and which clarifies the boundary between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour; 
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3. Flexible culture, i.e. the essential feature which allows an organization to 
adapt and reconfigure; 
4. Learning culture. 
 
These four subcomponents interact to create an informed culture, i.e. an 
environment in which “those who manage and operate the system have current 
knowledge about the human, technical, organizational and environmental factors that 
determine the safety of the system as a whole”. 
6.4 Approaches for improving safety culture 
Although there is no prescriptive formula for improving safety culture, some 
common characteristics have been identified, and approaches that has been 
successful in a number of countries. In the recent years there has been increased 
focus on the improvement of safety culture via a systematic approach which is based 
on the establishment of a management system. In fact, general consensus exists on 
the fact that safety “has to be achieved and maintained by means of an effective 
management system” and that the management system “has to ensure the promotion 
of a safety culture” [29].  
 
 Moreover, there has been increased attention to the contribution of human 
behavioural sciences to the development of safety good practices. With the purpose of 
improving safety culture, some countries have chosen for an approach emphasizing 
the use of behavioural sciences, whilst others have preferred to enhance safety 
performance via the management system approach. There is consensus that a good 
approach should consider both behavioural science and management system 
approaches, and take into account also the national and organizational cultures [22]. 
The development and maintenance of safety culture needs both a top-down and 
bottom-up approach. In this respect, the role of leadership is paramount.  
 
Organisations with a mature safety culture focus more on the overall goals than on 
compliance with procedures. Three stages of development of the safety culture of an 
organization have been identified, and can be used as a basis for the assessment of 
the maturity of the safety culture of an organisation:  
1. Stage I – Safety based only on rules and regulations; 
2. Stage II – Good safety performance becomes an organizational goal; 
3. Stage III – Safety Performance can always be improved. 
The typical features showed by an organization in each of the three stages are 
given in the quoted reference. The main points are summarized hereafter. 
 
An organization positioned at Stage-I perceives safety as an external requirement 
imposed by national government, regional authorities and regulatory body. The 
organization is not aware of and not interested in the influence on safety of behavioural 
and attitudinal aspects; mainly it is focused on procedural compliance. A Stage-I 
organization usually shows a blame-culture, which blames people who failed to comply 
with the rules. Communication is also very poor, and departments and functions are 
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isolated or in conflict. As a consequence, a Stage-I organization is usually not able to 
anticipate problems. 
 
In Stage-II, the organization is aware of the importance of safety, and sets 
objectives and targets for safety performance, as for other aspects of the business. 
Still, the organization shows lack of awareness of the behavioural issues. A Stage-II 
organization usually encourages cross-departmental and functional communication 
and co-operation. Mistakes are occasion for developing the control in place and 
retraining the staff. A blame-culture, although less marked, is still present. The 
organization still regards safety as separated from – and competing with – production. 
 
In Stage-III the organization is focused on safety performance and is aware of the 
impact of behaviour and attitudes on safety. A stage-III organization pays major 
attention to: management style, communication, people development, and is 
committed to continuously improve. Mistakes are regarded as learning opportunities, 
and require a clear understanding of what has happened. Safety and production 
performances are seen interrelated and not conflicting. The organization has usually a 
collaborative relationship with the regulator, suppliers, customers and contractors.  
 
The time-schedule needed to an organization to evolve through the mentioned 
stages depends on the initial state of the organization and on its commitment to 
change and on its resources devoted to the process of change. In general, the 
enhancement of safety culture is a lengthy process.  
6.5 Influence of the regulatory body on the safety culture of the 
licensee 
The operating organization, i.e. the company or utility authorized by the regulatory 
body to operate one or more nuclear power plants, “is completely in charge of the 
plant, with full responsibility and commensurate authority for approved activities in the 
safe production of electric power” [30]. Other organizations, such as designers, 
manufacturers and constructors, employers, contractors, consignors and carriers also 
have legal, professional or functional responsibilities with regard to safety [31].  
 
The regulatory body too, by fulfilling its statutory obligations, plays a fundamental 
role with respect to safety. There are remarkable differences in the regulatory approach 
to safety.  
From a practical point of view, three main types of approaches may be identified [32]: 
1. Compliance-based; 
2. Outcomes-oriented; 
3. Process-based 
In the first approach, the focus is on the application of standards and requirements. 
With the second approach, the regulatory body focus is on establishing indicators and 
monitoring them, investigating cases of negative trends.  
The latter approach is focused on the organizational systems that ensure 
continuous safe operation. The operating organization has to demonstrate to the 
regulatory body that a continuous assessment of the key processes is in place, and 
that areas for improvement are identified and receive appropriate follow-up.  
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The compliance-based approach seems to be the less effective for improving the 
safety culture of the organization, because it is founded on the assumption that safety 
relies in particular on the compliance with rules. The risk of this approach is to regard 
safety under a technical perspective, disregarding the complexity of safety culture.  
 
The second approach presents the difficulty of identifying suitable indicators, in 
particular leading indicators that have a predictive function. The process-based 
regulation may offer the advantage of flexibility, if the operating organization 
implements a flexible process-design which allows it to adapt to the changing 
environment. More that the second approach, and even more than the first one, the 
process-based regulation underpins the establishment of a learning culture within the 
licensee, because it spreads more within the organization the feelings of responsibility 
and ownership of safety.  
 
In the reality, the generic regulatory approaches present a combination of the main 
features of the described approaches.  
 
The regulatory framework establishes a relationship between two (or more) 
organizations, one being the regulatory body, and another being the operating 
organization. One of the tasks of the regulatory body is to promote safety culture in the 
organizations under its jurisdiction. For this purpose it is important that regulatory 
personnel are trained on safety management, safety culture and on how to intervene 
on organizations for achieving the desired changes. Vice-versa, the risk is that the 
regulatory action will not favour, or even impede, the development of an effective 
safety culture within the licensee. Another fundamental factor is the existence of a 
positive, open dialogue between regulator and licensee.  
7 Conclusions 
 
The research carried out during the first year of SONIS activity confirmed that 
human and organizational factors are very important contributors to events occurring in 
the nuclear industry. Their impact on the safety of nuclear installations is even 
enhanced in the changing socio-technical context which characterizes the energy 
market, because the ongoing liberalization, deregulation, changes in the institutional 
ownership and outsourcing impose new organisational challenges on the nuclear 
industry.  
 
Human factors have been an area of research and development since the accident 
of Three-Miles Island (1979). In spite of the efforts devoted to the topic, the need to 
achieve a unified approach is felt. 
 
It is confirmed that factors as weakness of safety culture, inappropriateness and 
complexity of the organisation, limits of operational feedback, production pressures, 
failure of control mechanisms are major contributors to events occurred in several 
process industries. 
 
The study shows that special attention has been devoted to procedures, notoriously 
a form of aid which guides operators in performing tasks; they are very useful 
especially in cases (e.g. emergency operation) where the absence of procedures 
would imply a consequent physical and cognitive overload on the operator.  
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The operation experience shows that the use of procedures can also have 
drawbacks, in particular if procedures are too complex and/or unclear.  For this reason, 
it is recommended that human factors specialists are brought into the process of 
designing procedures. 
 
The responsibilities and limitations of the regulatory framework is another area of 
concern, and the need to exploit the results of the research on human and 
organisational factors, to enhancing the effectiveness of the regulatory oversight, is 
pointed out. 
 
Among others, the role of the regulator should be to help the licensee in the 
enhancement of its safety culture. In this view, it seems that process-based regulation 
is the most suitable for allowing the licensee to develop own solutions for self-
regulation and safety culture awareness. 
 
Finally, it is stressed that managerial tools as management systems have a key role 
in enhancing the safety of operating nuclear installations, and that the current trends 
aim at integrating the management systems. This process implies that safety, 
environment, human resources and economical aspects, are not treated separately but 
receive a comprehensive, holistic approach. 
8 Suggestions for future work 
 
From a theoretical point of view, additional efforts are needed to improve the 
understanding of the influence of human and organisational factors on the safety 
performance of nuclear installations.  
 
From a practical point of view, efforts should be devoted to conceive a method or tool 
for monitoring the safety performances in a predictive manner.  
As a first step, it would be interesting, and strongly recommended, to review the 
available deterministic and probabilistic methods and tools for assessing and 
monitoring the effects of human and organisational factors, as well as the available 
operational experience. 
 
Because of the global trend, in the nuclear industry, towards the integration of 
management systems, and considering that licensee organisations and regulators 
have limited experience of the impact of the integration of safety management in 
management systems as a whole, the topic should be further investigated and the 
relevant experience collected and compared. 
 
Efforts should also be devoted to use the outcomes of the research on human and 
organisational factors in the regulatory process, for improving the regulatory efficacy. 
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